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Abstract
This thesis examines whether there is a frame difference in online news coverage of the
controversial 2014 Crimean referendum by The New York Times and the Russian newspaper,
Kommersant. The research is grounded in framing theory and literature on the attribution of
news sources. The study is conducted in two languages and it seeks to examine how media
systems, perspectives on the issue, journalistic standards, as well as cultural backgrounds and
historical ties influenced framing of the event.
Sample online articles from each newspaper were selected and a quantitative content
analysis was performed in order to identify the main themes, frames and source attribution
patterns in media news coverage about the referendum. The pattern to quote official sources
for providing justification and legitimacy to news stories has influenced the coverage in both
newspapers: both The New York Times as well as Kommersant heavily relied on their
respective government officials and experts. However, The New York Times provided a
greater diversity of opinions supporting the values of a libertarian media system.
Politics was the dominant theme of the referendum-related articles in both newspapers,
however, Kommersant and The New York Times touched on economy and military themes
with different frequencies. A comparison between themes in two periods (before and after the
referendum) has not shown a meaningful difference for both newspapers.
Kommersant’s online coverage was less critical of Russian policies and frequently
utilized a set of the For-referendum frames, rarely touching upon Russian military activities
on the peninsula. However, the frame depicting breach of international law appeared with the
same frequency as the For-referendum frames, showing that Kommersant tried to maintain
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independence under the Russian neo-authoritarian media system. The New York Times
focused on the illegitimate character of Crimean annexation and exposed every move of
Russian troops, which is in line with U.S. foreign policy aims. However, the American
publications did not hide the cultural and historical ties between Crimea and Russia and
frequently mentioned the illegal character pertaining to Ukrainian protests and a temporary
government.

v

Chapter One
Introduction
At the end of 2013 Ukraine experienced anti-government protests after Ukrainian
president Viktor Yanukovych postponed the signing of the Association Agreement with the
European Union under economic pressure from Russia (“Ukraine suspends preparations”,
2013). The protests in Kiev escalated into violent mass riots that left dozens of people dead
and eventually led to the ouster of Yanukovych. The unrest spread beyond the capital and
shifted to eastern Ukraine and Crimea, an autonomous part of Ukraine with close historical
and cultural ties to Russia and the ethnic Russian majority. On February 27, 2014
unidentified armed men seized the headquarters of the Crimean local government, while an
emergency session of the Crimean parliament voted for a new head –Sergey Aksyonov, the
leader of a pro-Russia political party (Siddique, McCarthy, & Yuhas, 2014). A few days later
the Crimean parliament voted unanimously in favor of formally seceding from Ukraine and
becoming part of Russia. It was also decided to conduct a public referendum on the issue.
The referendum on Crimea’s status took place on March 16, 2014 and an overwhelming
majority of Crimeans supported reunification with Russia (Herszenhorn, 2014). Ukraine, U.S.
and EU officials criticized the referendum as illegitimate, however, on March 18 Russian
president Vladimir Putin signed a treaty to incorporate Crimea into the Russian Federation.
The Western world refuses to recognize Crimea as a part of Russia condemning the
annexation and Russia’s violation of international law (“Ukraine: Putin signs Crimea
annexation”, 2014).
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The 2014 Crimean crisis has drawn a lot of media attention internationally. The
annexation has been of political interest to many parties around the world and has intensified
discussions about sovereignty, the right of self-determination, international law and a future
political and economic landscape. The mass media is very powerful and influential in shaping
public opinion regarding various issues, because “media may not only tell us what to think
about, but also how to think about it, and, consequently, what to think” (McCombs & Shaw,
1993, p. 65). To general public, the understanding of the events in Ukraine is totally
dependent on news media such as newspapers, TV news, and online news (Watanabe, 2014).
In that regard, it is important to explore media coverage of Crimea’s annexation and uncover
how different parties portrayed the event.
To date there has been little research on the nature of news coverage of Crimea
annexation by Russia in 2014 and there have been few studies examining the framing
differences of online publications by American and Russian newspapers. The particular
countries were chosen because they represent different media systems (libertarian and neoauthoritarian), have different cultural backgrounds and hold opposite views on the events that
happened ahead and followed the referendum on Crimean status. The study seeks to examine
how those differences affected news framing of Crimea’s annexation. Of particular interest is
the fact that Russia played a major role in the event and the fact that it has yet to be
uncovered how Russia justified its controversial actions.
As news sources may have a significant effect on a news story (Shoemaker and Reese,
1991), the study also explores what sources the reporters from different countries utilized in
their publications. Content analysis and cross-cultural comparison of online publications by
The New York Times and Kommersant is used in order to reach that goal. These media outlets
were chosen because they are arguably the most influential newspapers in their respective
countries that provide high-quality content in their print and digital versions. The study will
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explore online versions of the newspapers because the Internet has become a major source of
news (Omar, 2014) and online news consumption has been increasing while print circulation
keeps dropping (Chyi & Yang, 2009; Mitchelstein & Boczkowski, 2010). The sample under
study covers a period of two months (one month before the referendum and one month
afterwards) and it was analyzed by a quantitative content analysis grounded in framing
theory. This paper contributes to the framing research within the cross-cultural context by
including Russian and Western news outlets to establish possible differences across
newspapers and nations.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review
Framing is one of the most common theories applied for the research in the field of
communication and media studies. Media framing is considered to be “a tool of power that
can be used in the struggle to define whose view of the world will predominate” (Hallah,
1999, p. 223). The thesis is grounded in framing theory, therefore the literature review
provides an overview of framing theoretical framework and presents previous studies of
framing applications to international news coverage.
In order to provide a better understanding of frames in the coverage of Crimea’s
annexation by Russian and the U.S. newspapers, the review then outlines major differences in
media systems of those two countries, explains the importance of source attribution patterns
and presents a context of the Crimean referendum. The final part of the review focuses on the
various implications involved and explores Russian and Western perspectives on the issue.
Frame and Framing Process
The term “frame” was introduced by the English anthropologist Gregory Bateson
(1972) and was later applied to communication studies by Erving Goffman (1974).
According to Goffman, a frame is a schema of interpretation that helps people to “locate,
perceive, identify, and label events and occurrences, thus rendering meaning, organizing
experiences, and guiding actions” (p. 21). Todd Gitlin (1980) defines frames as “persistent
patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion,
by which symbol handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual” (p. 6). As
Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) observe, “frames influence opinions by stressing values,

4

facts, and other considerations, endowing them with greater apparent relevance to the issue
than they might appear to have under an alternative frame” (p. 569). Similarly, Tankard
(2001) claims that frames supply a context and suggests “what the issue is through the use of
selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration” (p. 100). Reese (2001) notes that frames are
socially shared and persistent over time. The literature on framing theory indicates that the
term could be understood as either a noun of frame or the process of framing (Zhang, 1999).
According to Wu (2006), framing is “one way, and indeed a most important way, of
uncovering the complexity of the social construction of reality” (p. 253). Entman (1993) was
one of the first researchers to define framing within the context of mass communications: “To
frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in the
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal
interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p.
52). According to Entman (1993), framing involves two processes: selection and salience.
Selection entails inclusion and exclusion. Including certain aspects of an issue makes
them more salient than the aspects of the issue that are excluded by the selection. Selection
process in framing theory has a lot in common with a gatekeeping concept that highlights
selection bias by using particular news sources and omitting the ones less admissible to
journalistic routine practices and media organizations (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009). Selection of
news sources is particularly important for the proposed study that seeks to examine source
attribution patterns of two media outlets and will be discussed in a separate section of the
literature review.
Salience is defined by Entman as “making a piece of information more noticeable,
meaningful, or memorable to audiences” (p. 53). An increase in salience improves the
probability that the audience will remember the information. In addition to selection and
salience, previous studies also indicate that the influence on frame sensitivity and
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interpretation depends on individual’s attitude and knowledge of an issue, strength of the
messages, and the amount of exposure one has to a frame (Chong & Druckman, 2007;
Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009).
Van Gorp (2007) summarizes several elements that play a role in framing: schemata,
frame packages, framing devices, and reasoning devices. It is crucial to understand these
elements for a better comprehension of frame analysis’ results. Schemata are “mentally
stored clusters of ideas that guide the individual's processing of information” (Entman, 1993,
p. 53). A frame package is an integrated structured kit for the frame that consists of the
framing devices and reasoning devices. Framing devices include the word choice, the use of
metaphors, exemplars, descriptions, depictions, catchphrases, and visual images (Gamson &
Modigliani, 1989). In addition, some researchers indicate the importance of “the choices
about language, quotations and relevant information” (Shah et al. 2002, p. 367), an evaluation
of the newsworthiness of an event (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Tankard has proposed the most
comprehensive identification, which consists of eleven framing mechanisms or devices
(related mostly to news framing): “(1) headlines, (2) subheads, (3) photos, (4) photo captions,
(5) leads, (6) source selection, (7) quotes selection, (8) pull quotes, (9) logos, (10) statistics
and charts, and (11) concluding statements and paragraph” (Tankard, 2001, p. 101). Lastly,
reasoning devices are explicit and implicit reasoning that deal with justifications, causes and
consequences of the issue being reported.
According to Entman (1993), frames have four locations in the communication
process: communicators, text, receiver, and culture. Communicators (authors of texts) make
judgments and apply various frames to their texts. The receiver of the message (the reader) is
either sensitive to those frames and does or does not perceive them. Lastly, culture is
described as a “set of common frames exhibited in the discourse and thinking of most people
in a social grouping” (pp. 52-53). This idea was probably built upon Goffman’s idea (1981)
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about the influence of cultural background on sensitivity to different frames. The influence of
culture is also important for the study, as it examines framing of coverage by newspapers of
the two countries with different cultural backgrounds. The four aforementioned locations are
connected with four functions of frames according to Entman (1993): to define problems, to
diagnose causes, to make moral judgments, and to suggest remedies.
After defining a frame and a framing concept and before moving forward to framing of
international news, it is important to shed light on the process of framing and its stages.
Scheufele (1999) distinguishes four stages in the framing process: frame building, frame
setting, individual effects of framing, and journalists as audiences. Frame building focuses on
how media outlets choose specific frames and negotiate them to their receivers. There are a
variety of factors that could potentially influence how journalists frame a given issue
including societal norms and values, organizational pressures and constraints, external
pressures from interest groups and other policy makers, journalistic routines, and ideological
or political orientation (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Tuchman, 1978; Bennett & Entman,
2001). The Crimea case under examination is a highly politicized and controversial issue, the
potential influence of abovementioned factors on frame building in the coverage of three
countries is discussed further in the section about the differences of media systems in Russia
and in the U.S.
The second major stage of the framing process is frame setting. Frame setting
underlines the effects of frames by examining the ways that media highlight different facts
and values to make an issue appear more relevant (Scheufele, 1999, p. 116). De Vreese
(2005) claims that frame setting refers to the “interaction between media frames and
individuals’ prior knowledge and predispositions” (p. 52). Media effects theorists usually
analyze frame setting on two levels: the macro-level and micro-level effects of that content
(Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009). The concept of two levels is also mentioned by de Vreese
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(2005) who outlines the individual and the societal level: “An individual level consequence
may be altered attitudes about an issues based on exposure to certain frames. On the societal
level, frames may contribute to shaping social level processes such as political socialization,
decision-making, and collective actions” (de Vreese, 2005, p. 52).
The individual level discussed by de Vreese (2005) is consistent with the third stage of
the framing process by Scheufele (2000) that examined how frames of social movements
influence individuals. Early in 1974 Goffman noticed that journalists package news stories
and in the process they give stories meaning. McQuail (2003) acknowledges that media
outlets are the main means of public expression in our society; the frames journalists use help
readers to process the complex amount of information available. It means that news frames
are powerful and influential. Tankard (2001) acknowledges “the power of framing comes
from its ability to define the terms of a debate without the audience realizing it is taking
place” (p. 97). However, being themselves the receivers of news from other sources,
journalists may also be influenced by the frames already in use and then may apply them to
their stories. Scheufele (1999) calls it a fourth stage of the framing process.
The previous studies on framing news indicate that media content does not mirror the
reality: it is through the framing of media discourses that reality is defined and organized
(Price, Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997; Tankard, 2001). Mass media outlets decide “not only
what events to be covered but also how the events are covered” (Liu 2009, p. 6). Thus,
framing can affect the individual and public knowledge of a news topic, this makes it a
perfect framework for the study. In the next sections we will focus on different types of
frames commonly applied to news coverage and examine framing of international and
political issues.
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Types of Frames
Researchers do not always agree on what frames to look for in framing studies. It is
generally assumed that the types of frames investigated depend on the types of issues under
examination. Tewksbury and Scheufele (2009) summarize types of frames commonly used in
media studies. They distinguish gain and loss frames (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), episodic
and thematic frames (Iyengar, 1991), strategy and issue frames (Capella & Jamieson, 1997), or
human interest, conflict and economic consequences frames (Price et al., 1997). In addition to
conflict, human interest and economic consequences frames, Semetko and Valkenburg (2000)
identify the frame of attribution of responsibility and the morality frame. The aforementioned
sets of frames are usually referred to as generic (de Vreese, 2005), because it is possible to
apply them to various issues across disciplines. However, mass communication studies have
also examined issue-specific frames applicable only to specific topics or events (de Vreese,
2005). Pan & Kosicki (1993) claim that issue-specific frames can significantly influence
perception and interpretation of stories. “An issue-specific approach to the study of news
frames allows for a profound level of specificity and details relevant to the event or issue under
investigation” (Semetko & de Vreese, 2004, p. 93). As the issue of the Crimean referendum is
very complex and unique, the research will be focused on certain generic frames as well as
issue-specific frames that are defined by preliminary analysis that examined the related
publications for “the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped
images, sources of information and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of
facts or judgments” (Entman 1993, p. 52). By defining the frames in this manner we will
provide insight into the complexity of how the occasion was covered by media outlets of two
different countries.
De Vreese (2004) also outlines two approaches for frame identification: 1) the inductive
approach “refrains from analyzing news stories with a prior defined news frames in mind” 2)
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the deductive approach “investigates frames that are defined and operationalized prior to the
investigation” (de Vreese, 2005, p. 53). As the focus of the study is on generic and issuespecific frames, the research utilizes both approaches. A preliminary analysis of media
coverage identified the most commonly used frames, the application of these frames will be
further examined by the use of content analysis techniques.
Framing International News and Political Issues
According to Flournoy and Stewart (1997), the audience's perception of a foreign
country is under the influence of foreign news coverage by their home media. Framing theory
has been “appropriate for analysing political and public controversy especially in the
international context because frames have the potential to explain cultural dynamics” (Liu,
2009, p. 8). Entman (1993) indicates that cultural contexts also might lead to different news
framing and further difference in interpretation. However, cultural context is not a single
variable that influences the perception of international and political news. Lippmann (1921)
acknowledges that “the artificial censorships, the limitations of social contact, the
comparatively meager time available in each day for paying attention to public affairs” force
people to rely on the information from the media outlets so they can know more about the
world events (p. 22). As certain events are distant and there is less approach and personal
involvement in the issue, framing is much more easier to be achieved (McQuail, 2000).
Shoemaker et al. (1991) note that events that occurred in nations perceived as important in
U.S. politics and economics had a greater chance to appear in news coverage. Kunczik (2002)
acknowledges that geographical and cultural proximity as well as tighter economic or
ideological relations with a foreign country lead to more intensive coverage of the country.
Previous studies on framing also indicate that the framing theory is impacted by the
socio-political reality (Scheufele, 1999; Entman, 1992; Pan et al., 1999). Bazaa and Hsiao
(2010) note that international news coverage is largely influenced by the state of diplomatic
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relationship between countries. Scheufele (1999) notes that government bureaucracies and
other political or corporate actors may potentially influence frame building. The previous
studies also examined such variables as history (Pan et al., 1999), national interest (Lee &
Yang, 1995), political ideology (Pan et al., 1999) and diplomatic sensitivity (Wang, 1992).
“Critical researchers consider media framing essentially a tool of power that can be used in the
struggle to define whose view of the world will predominate” (Hallah, 1999, p. 223). The
Crimean referendum had a wide international coverage and for a better understanding of
frames used in that particular case, it is important to overview a few examples of previous
studies on framing of international news, when political context, different ideologies and
media systems played a crucial role.
Framing International News: Examples
One of the most vivid examples of how social-political reality influences framing and
brings bias to news about international events is Entman’s (1991) study which compared the
U.S. news coverage of two similar international disasters: in 1983 the Soviet Union shot down
a South Korean civilian airliner and in 1988 the United States shot down an Iranian civilian
airliner. Due to a larger Cold War narrative, the Soviet Union was considered an enemy as well
as the Iranians, while South Korea has always been an ally of the United States. Thus, the
Korean disaster was portrayed as an intentional and deliberate attack by the Soviets, while the
Iranian airliner was framed by the U.S. media as an unfortunate mistake and tragedy. However,
it was not only a certain political reality that influenced framing of both events, but also the
direct involvement of the United States (as a communicator) in one of the incidents. According
to Graber (1980), the stories of American correspondents abroad must not only mirror the
American political values, but also confirm American stereotypes. The study examining
coverage of the 2011 Libyan uprising and NATO intervention by Qatari (Al Jazeera) and
British (BBC) broadcasters (Al Nahed, 2015) found out that both Qatari and British network
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displayed a pro-interventionist agenda that was in line with their foreign policy aims and
political context. It should be noted both Qatar and Britain actively participated in NATO
intervention. Kolmer and Semetko (2009) in their analysis of U.S., British, Czech, German,
South African and Al Jazeera news acknowledge that “the reporting of the war was
conditioned by the national contexts in which it was produced . . . [raising] . . . serious
questions about the credibility and impartiality of TV news in the reporting of war” (p. 654).
Findings about the impact of socio-political reality on Russian media framing are also
consistent with the concept that governmental and political context influence editorial policy.
For example, the 1999 conflict in Chechnya (when Russia carried out the Second Chechen
War) was portrayed in Russian media as ‘an anti-terrorist operation…fighting the threat of
international Islamic terrorism rather than secession’ by utilizing the frame of ‘War on
Terror’ (Snetkov 2007, p. 1352). Russian media demonized Chechen separatists and framed
them as “terrorists” linking the Chechen conflict to the global struggle against international
Islamic terrorism (de Waal 2004, p. 55).
All of these studies highlight the fact that journalists from different countries lack
independence when they cover international, politically sensitive issues. However, the lack of
independence may vary in accordance with a media system of a particular country and
journalistic practices in use. The next section is focused on differences in the media systems
of Russia and the U.S.
Media Systems of Russia and the U.S.
The classification of media systems has been discussed for many decades; various types
of media systems have been applied to different countries. The four types of media systems
identified by Siebert and Schramm (1956) became widely used after the publication of the
classic book Four Theories of the Press. The authors divide media systems according to the
following types: authoritarian, libertarian, Soviet communist and social responsibility type. In
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the authoritarian model, media serve the state through direct governmental control, journalists
are not allowed to speak out against the state; control is implemented by censorship and
punishment (Siebert, Peterson, Schramm, 1963; Oates, 2008). In the Soviet communist
model, media is also controlled by the state, however, this model is defined by a higher
volume of self-censorship. The main aim of media outlets in Soviet communist model is to
serve the interests of the working class and provide the Marxist-Leninist view of reality. The
libertarian model provides full autonomy to journalists and media organizations, allowing
attacks on the government and welcoming freedom of speech. The social responsibility
model is very close to the libertarian model, however, journalists are not completely free to
publish what they like as they have certain obligations to society to provide information and
balance (Siebert, Peterson, Schramm, 1963; Oates, 2008). Even though these four models
represent “ideal” situations and are rather simplistic (Oates, 2008), they reflect the major
differences and can help to identify a particular model for each country under examination.
According to this classification, the U.S. media system is usually described as
libertarian, as it welcomes diversity of opinions and operates under the principle of freedom
of speech (Merrill & Lowenstein, 1979; Oates, 2008). This model is characterized by low
state intervention, a strong form of journalistic professionalism, which is based on the
“objectivity norm” and political neutrality (Oates, 2008). Under this media system,
ownership of media is mainly private and there are no quotas for production and content, the
main emphasis is on transparency (Downey, Downey, & Mihelj, 2012).
In the case of modern Russia, it is very hard to fit its media system into any of the four
models. The roots of the Russian media system can be tracked to the Soviet communist
model. However, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, where media outlets served the
government and reinforced the Soviet ideology (Zasoursky, 2004), the model ceased to exist.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian media system has gone through a lot of
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changes: ideological bans were lifted and the 1990 Law on Press abolished censorship
(Koltsova, 2006). However, Marta Dyczok (2009) notices that even though there were
numerous official declarations about media’s independence in post-Soviet Russia, media
outlets of modern Russia “remain essentially dependent on politically powerful actors while
media content to a great extent reflects governmental policy” (p. 64). One of the most
fulfilling descriptions of the modern media system in Russia can be found in the essay of de
Smaele (2010). He states that in Russia the Western media “logic” prevails, however
“authoritarian practices overrule the societal and media democratization processes” (p. 6).
De Smaele (2010) also summarizes most commonly used labels concerning Russian media
system, such as: ‘transitional model’ (Curran & Park, 2000), ‘post-socialist’ (Giorgi, 1995),
‘post-communist’ media (Sparks, 1997) or ‘neo-authoritarian model’ (Becker, 2004).
Concerning the Russian media system, the study will utilize the description of neoauthoritarian model.
The difference between the media systems of the two countries under examination can
be also assessed by the Freedom of the Press report by Freedom House, which annually ranks
the performance of 197 countries according to the level of media independence (“Press
Freedom Rankings”, 2014). Based on this ranking, in 2014 the U.S. was classified as “Free”
(30th place out of 197), while Russia as “Not free” ranked 176th out of 197. Based on these
findings, the study suggests that media coverage of the U.S. with the libertarian media system
and Russia with the neo-authoritarian media system portrayed the Crimean crisis and
referendum through different dominant frames. It is also expected that there will be a broader
range of views (news sources) in the online coverage by the U.S. than by Russia. The
utilization of news sources is examined in the next section of the literature review as source
attribution patterns play a crucial role in framing (Tankard, 2001; Entnam, 1993).
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News Sources
Previous studies indicate that the choice of quotations and source selection is
significantly important for identifying and measuring news frames (Shah et al. 2002; Tankard,
2001). Sources provide a reader with the context and guide him toward particular thoughts,
increasing the authenticity of a story. In media research scholars have utilized such news
sources as government officials, law-enforcement sources, organizations or corporations,
people involved or affected by a news issue, etc. Shoemaker and Reese (1991) acknowledge
that sources may have a significant effect on a news story.
According to Sigal’s (1973) findings, official sources are quoted more often than
individuals in news stories. Zoch and Turk (1998) note that media outlets depend on
government officials for believability and credence. Similarly, Blumler and Gurevitch (1981)
state that in political news, official sources are usually the dominant sources. However, if the
selection of sources is limited to political elites, readers lack the diversity of opinions needed
for a more objective perception, thus they are more likely to be easily manipulated.
Given the importance of source attribution and its potential influence on the audience,
the study seeks to explore types of sources utilized by the reporters from Russia and the U.S. in
the online coverage of the Crimean referendum. In order to understand which factors may have
influenced Western and Russian coverage and which frames were applied by U.S. and Russian
media outlets in their news articles, the paper then provides an overview of historical, political,
economic, military and legal implications of the Crimean crisis, as well as Western and
Russian perspectives on the issue.

History of Crimea: Overview
Crimea is a peninsula on the northern coast of the Black Sea with a recorded history
that traces back to the 5th century BC, when the Greek settlements appeared along the coast.
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In the early periods of its historical development the territory of Crimea was colonized and
occupied by many other states and empires including the Romans, Scythians, Bulgars, Gots,
Huns, Khazars, the Byzantine Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. Between 14th-17th century
the Crimean aristocracy formed its own Khaganate as a part of the Ottoman Empire. The
modern history of Crimea begins in 1783, when it was conquered by the Russian Empress
Catherine the Great and became Russian territory.
The next war outbreak on the peninsula occurred between 1853-1856 – the Crimean
War when the Russian Empire was fighting against an alliance of Great Britain, France,
Sardinia, the Ottoman Empire and the Austrian Empire over the domination of the Black Sea.
By the end of the war, Crimea was devastated and the territory stayed under the Russian
control, the Black Sea was proclaimed a neutral zone.
Following the Communist Revolution of 1917, Crimea became a part of the Soviet
Union and was given a status of Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1921. During
WWII the Germans invaded the Soviet Union. In 1944 the Soviet Union liberated Crimea,
but Stalin accused the Crimean Tatars (the native population of Crimea) of co-operating with
the Nazis and forcibly deported 200,000 Tatars to Siberia (Daydov, 2008). Crimea became an
overwhelmingly Russian populated territory (Bebler, 2015). Following the radical ethnic
cleansing, Crimea lost its pre-war autonomous status and became a part of the Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR).
Not long after the death of Stalin, in 1954, Crimea was transferred to the Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic. Communist officials described this change of Crimea’s affiliation
as a symbolic brotherly gesture, which marked the 300th anniversary of Ukraine joining the
Republic (Bebler, 2015). The consequences of this transfer were not dramatic as the changes
were insignificant because Crimea stayed within the Soviet Union (Wydra, 2014). After an
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all-Ukrainian referendum in February 1991, the territory of Crimea was upgraded again to the
status of an autonomous republic within Ukrainian SSR.
The latest change of Crimean status before the 2014 annexation happened following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. When the agreement on the Soviet collapse was
signed at the meeting of Russian, Ukrainian and Belarus leaders in Belovezhskaya Pushcha,
Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed that Crimea could remain in Ukraine, with Russia's
Black Sea fleet remaining at the largest Crimean city Sevastopol under lease (Wydra, 2014).
Crimea was given significant autonomy (its own constitution, legislature and its own
president). The periods of Crimean territorial affiliation during the 20th century are
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
Crimean Territorial Affiliation During the 20th Century
1921-1945
1945-1954
1954-1991
1991-2014

an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the USSR
an administrative region (oblast) in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist
Republic
an administrative region (oblast) in the Ukrainian Soviet Federative Socialist
Republic
An Autonomous Republic within independent Ukraine

A brief historical overview shows that modern history of Crimea is connected with
Russia. Not only has Crimea’s Sevastopol long been a home city for the Russian Black Sea
fleet, but also, according to the all-Ukrainian population census data of 2001, 58.5% of the
citizens identify themselves as Russian, compared to the 24.4% identifying with Ukraine, and
12.1% identifying as Crimean Tatar. In 2013-2014 the unprecedented series of events in
Ukraine provoked significant political changes and shocked the international community:
Ukrainian civil riots led to the annexation of Crimea by Russia. In the next section we
examine how the Ukrainian crisis of 2013-2014 resulted in the annexation of Crimea and
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provide an overview of the connected implications as well as Russian and Western
perspectives.
Ukrainian Crisis and Political Implications
In November 2013 the president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, announced the
suspension of a trade agreement with the European Union, in order to preserve Ukraine’s
national security, while seeking cooperation with Russia. This pro-Russian stance of
Yanukovych led to growing protests on the central square of Kiev - Maidan (these protests
are usually referred to as ‘Euromaidan’ as protesters demanded closer relations with the
European Union). By the middle of December, when Ukraine signed an economic agreement
with Russia instead of the European Union, mass protests had become more organized and
grown up to 800,000 people (Baczynska, 2014). The Ukrainian Parliament passed, and then
annulled restrictive anti-protest laws that resulted in several deaths; street riots became even
more violent, eighty-eight protesters were killed in two days (DeFronzo, 2014).
Meanwhile, the Crimean autonomous government strongly supported pro-Russian
Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych and condemned the unrest. In February, Euromaidan
swept away the president with the support of an ultra-right militia and other leaders of the
pro-European opposition. On 21 February, Yanukovych signed a deal with the opposition
leaders and fled the capital. Suspending the constitution, Parliament voted to remove
Yanukovych from power and to hold new presidential elections in May, 2014. The newly
elected temporary government with Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk was considered
illegitimate by Russia, the Russian officials viewed the events as a “coup d'état” (Trenin,
2014).
The unrest in Kiev triggered a political crisis in Crimea: on 23rd February pro-Russian
demonstrations took place in the Crimean city of Sevastopol, while Tatar protestors in
support of Euromaidan clashed with pro-Russian protestors in Simferopol, another major
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Crimean city (Crimean Tatars, 2014). On 27th February, Viktor Yanukovych claimed he was
still rightful president of Ukraine and asked Russia for protection from extremists in his
country. On the same day the unidentified troops seized the local Crimean parliament and
local government buildings, Russian flags were raised over those buildings. At the time of the
conflict, the Russian government refused to acknowledge that the troops without insignia that
occupied the Crimean peninsula were Russian Armed Forces and called them “local militias”,
denying any accusations of international law violations. Under the influence of Russia,
during this armed occupation the deputies of Crimean parliament elected a pro-Russian
chairman of the council of ministers of the republic - Sergey Aksyonov. On 1st March, 2014
the Russian Federation Council (the upper chamber of Parliament) officially approved an
appeal by President Vladimir Putin to give permission for Russian troops to be sent into
Ukraine to assist in “the normalization of the social and political situation in that country”
(Waterfield & Henderson, 2014) and to “protect Russian interests” in Crimea as “self-defense
forces” for the largely Russian population of that region” (Willi, 2015).
Following this move from Russia, Crimea’s parliament stated unanimously that the
district wished to join Russia: the local parliament session voted to hold a regional
referendum on the status of Crimea. Fifteen days later, the majority of the Crimean
population (97%) voted for the option to become a part of Russia in a controversial
referendum condemned by most Western states as illegitimate. On 18 March President Putin
signed a bill to absorb Crimea into the Russian Federation.
Legal Implications
The annexation of Crimea and the Crimean referendum have drawn much international
attention and sparked a debate about international law. In his March special address to the
Russian Parliament, Russian president Vladimir Putin stated that the referendum in Crimea
was held "in full accordance with democratic procedure and international law" and emphasized

19

that Crimea has always been “an inalienable part of Russia” (Mezzofiore, 2014). The opinion
of most Western countries is opposite for a number of reasons.
Burke-White in the article Crimea and the International Legal Order (2014) outlines that
Russia “has cleverly embraced international law and, in so doing, exploited the tension
between a fundamental principle that prohibits the acquisition of territory through the use of
force and an equally fundamental right of self-determination to take Crimea as its own” (p.
65). The first principle is embodied in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: “all Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state” (Charter of the United Nations, n.d.). In 1970
the UN General Assembly also proclaimed “no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat
or use of force shall be recognized as legal” (General Assembly Resolution 2625, 1970). In his
March speech, Putin denied all the accusations saying that Russia’s Armed Forces did not
enter Crimea, they had been already there according to the previously negotiated treaty, and all
the armed unidentified forces that occupied local facilities by force had no connections with
Russian Army (“Vladimir Putin answered journalists’ questions,” 2014). It should be noted,
that only a year after the events, in March, 2015 Putin finally admitted to ordering Russian
troops to seize Crimea weeks before it was annexed by Russia.
The second principle is the principle of self-determination –“respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples” (Charter of the United Nations, n.d.) that
provides a post-colonial or severely oppressed population the right to freely determine its
status in the international community and future government. Burke-White (2014)
acknowledges that Putin claimed “a broad right of intervention in protecting ethnic Russians,
and a very low standard for the degree of oppression necessary to trigger the right of selfdetermination and subsequent independence” (p.68). In his speech Putin also reminded the
audience of the U.S. position during the Kosovo conflict: “declarations of independence may,
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and often do, violate domestic legislation. However, this does not make them violations of
international law (“Address by President of the Russian Federation,” 2014).
Finally, Putin concluded his address by arguing that the Russian peoples of Crimea had
freely and fairly chosen to join with Russia as “the referendum was fair and transparent, and
the people of Crimea clearly and convincingly expressed their will and stated that they want to
be with Russia” (“Address by President of the Russian Federation,” 2014). However, in reality
the Crimea population had only been presented with two options: to reunify “Crimea with
Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation’” or to restore “the 1992 Crimea constitution and
the status of Crimea as part of Ukraine” (Brunova-Kalisetska, 2014). Other choices, for
example, to remain in Ukraine under the current constitutional structure or to become an
independent state were omitted. Burke-White (2014) states that these factors resulted in the
UN General Assembly decision to condemn the referendum as illegal.
As summarized by Giuliani (2015), by annexing Crimea, Vladimir Putin has not only
violated the fundamental texts of the United Nations, but also violated the statutes of the
Council of Europe of which Russia is a member, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the terms of
the 1994 Budapest Memorandum signed by Russia, the U.S., France and the U.K., two
bilateral treaties signed with Ukraine, as well as the constitutions of Ukraine and Crimea. A
resolution of the European Parliament dated March, 13th "firmly condemned Russia's act of
aggression in invading Crimea, which is an inseparable part of Ukraine and recognized as such
by the Russian Federation" (Paul, 2015). Most of the western countries, along with the Ukraine
and the UN members from North America, Central, Oceania and Africa, have not recognized
the Republic of Crimea as part of Russia. As of February 2016, Crimea has been recognized
only by eleven nations other than Russia: Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, Nicaragua, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.
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Military Implications
According to the Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet of
1997 between Ukraine and Russia, Russia was entitled to have up to 25,000 troops in Crimea
as its Black Sea Fleet. Bebler (2015) and other western experts and observers claim that at the
time of occupation, the estimated number of troops might have exceeded the negotiated
number and achieved up to 30,000 Russian troops. Bebler (2015) also states that the military
annexation of Crimea was prepared and professionally executed. In his emotional speech
after the Crimea annexation, Putin denied all the accusations about military invasion by
saying that Russian troops were sent to Crimea in line with a previously negotiated treaty,
and the militias who occupied Crimean local government buildings, airports and other
facilities were not Russian military, but rather local pro-Russian forces (“Address
by President of the Russian Federation,” 2014). Thus, according to Russian president, Russia
never violated international law because its military never invaded Crimea.
According to Bebler (2015), three factors facilitated a successful military operation.
Firstly, the Russian troops were already legally present on the Crimean peninsula. Secondly,
the short distances to the most important strategic locations in Crimea “allowed for the quick
insertion of air transported troops and the acquisition of targets” (Bebler, 2015, p 41).
Thirdly, the Ukrainian militias of Crimea were given an order from the Ukrainian
government not to resist. Thus, about 20,000 Ukrainian military personnel capitulated
without a single shot fired. Moreover, most of them decided to remain in Crimea and swore
an oath to the Russian flag. Although Russia de facto occupied Crimea, a military occupation
regime was not established. Bebler (2015) concludes by saying that the annexation of Crimea
“allowed for an increase in Russian military capabilities by taking over most of the Ukrainian
Black Sea Fleet, about 190 Ukrainian military installations, stocks of arms, ammunition and
other equipment” (p. 41).
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Russian Perspective
The Russian perspective on the Ukrainian crisis and further incorporation of Crimea is
grounded in three main narratives.
Firstly, Russia perceives the admission of East European states into the EU and NATO,
as well as NATO defense strategies (plans to deploy missile defense systems in East Europe)
as a vital threat to its national security (Block, 2015). In his special address to a joint session
of the two chambers of the Russian Parliament on March 18, 2014, Vladimir Putin clearly
presented the geopolitical rationale for the annexation of Crimea. NATO’s presence in close
proximity to Russia’s borders, “on Russia’s historic territories”, remains, to President Putin,
an unacceptable compromise, thus the annexation prevented Crimea’s possible inclusion into
the North Atlantic Treaty area (Bebler, 2015). Hansen (2015) also acknowledges that the
alleged Western support for the “color revolutions” in post-Soviet states such as Georgia
(2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005) became a very important component of the
contemporary Russian understanding of Self.
Secondly, Russia sees Ukraine as an important element of its own integration
processes, “a factor, which guarantees the consolidation of Russian society and which rests
on a thesis of shared history and shared historical memory” (Shelest, 2015, p.197). In his
address, Vladimir Putin also highlighted Crimea’s “invaluable civilizational and even sacral
importance for Russia, like the Temple Mount in Jerusalem for the followers of Islam and
Judaism” (“Address by President of the Russian Federation,” 2014). Crimea is framed as a
region that is inherently Russian (Willi, 2015). The reunification with Crimea was said to
undo the unconstitutional and unjust division from Russia sixty years earlier (Bebler, 2014).
Western countries (and particularly the U.S.) are viewed as parties who orchestrated the
regime change in Kiev in order to set Ukraine against Russia (Hansen, 2015). In the address
Putin states: “And with Ukraine, our Western partners have crossed the line, playing the bear

23

and acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally. After all, they were fully aware that there are
millions of Russians living in Ukraine and in Crimea. They must have really lacked political
instinct and common sense not to foresee all the consequences of their actions” (“Address
by President of the Russian Federation,” 2014).
The third main narrative around the Crimean referendum and further annexation is a
perceived growing threat from far-right extremist parties for the majority of Crimea’s
population, which identifies themselves as Russians and speaks Russian language. During the
Euromaidan protests, the Ukrainian Parliament proposed a bill to repel the Ukrainian
language law, which guaranteed the use of two official languages in regions where the size of
an ethnic minority exceeded 10%. This proposal triggered anxiety and caused demonstrations
all over the territories where Russian language is widely used. Although the acting Ukrainian
President Turchynov quickly exercised his veto, the Russian population of Crimea no longer
felt represented by and within the Ukrainian state. Russia did not recognize a newly elected
Ukrainian government perceiving it as “neo-Nazi”; from the Russian perspective, by
annexing the peninsula, Russia helped to protect the Russian people (Wydra, 2014). Putin
numerously emphasized the need to help Ukraine’s Russian population and protect them
from the ‘fascist junta’ in Kiev (Motyl, 2015). Shelest (2015) acknowledges that Crimean
referendum has become a success story only in Russian domestic politics, but it remains a
failure inside Ukraine and internationally.

Western Perspective
The conflict over Crimea developed in an international environment, which, apart from
Ukraine and Russia, directly involved other important actors such as the European Union, the
United States, the United Nations, NATO, OSCE. Many European countries opposed
Russia’s international law violations and aggressive stance. The leaders of the 28-member
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European Union suspended trade and visa liberalization negotiations with Russia and
threatened “additional and far reaching consequences” should Russia further destabilize
Ukraine (“Putin's Stance on Ukraine,” 2014).
Before the Crimean referendum European Union President Herman Van Rompuy
stated: “We strongly condemn Russia’s unprovoked violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and
territorial integrity” (“Extraordinary summit,” 2014). His position was backed by other
European leaders such as Italian Premier Matteo Renzi, German Chancellor Angela Merkel,
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. The U.S. agreed with the new Kiev government that the
planned Crimea referendum on joining Russia would violate the Ukrainian constitution and
that any such vote should be held nationwide. Before the referendum President Barack
Obama noted that “the proposed referendum on the future of Crimea would violate the
Ukrainian constitution and violate international law” (Burke-White, 2014, p. 74). On March,
10 British Prime Minister David Cameron said: “Ukraine should be able to choose its own
future and act as a bridge between Russia and Europe” (Holehouse, 2014). British Foreign
Secretary William Hague described the political situation as “the ‘biggest crisis’ facing
Europe in the 21st Century” (Robinson, 2014).
According to the Western perspective, Russian actions in Crimea constitute a
fundamental challenge to the order in Europe. Bock, Henneberg and Plank (2014)
acknowledge that the Western coverage of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which
undoubtedly violated international law, has been framed as neo-imperialist or even neoSoviet response. The authors continue stating that “Russian foreign policy has been portrayed
as aiming to re-establish imperial control of the ‘‘near abroad’’ (i.e., the newly independent
republics that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union)—and in particular of
Ukraine” (p. 102). Western countries also perceive the military invasion conducted by Russia
as a very dangerous sign and a possible trigger to the events that would further threaten
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European security and stability.
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Chapter Three
Research Questions
The objective of the thesis is to examine how the Crimean referendum in 2014 was
covered in online publications of Russian and U.S. newspapers. For that purpose two online
versions of respected and influential newspapers were selected for further analysis. The New
York Times and Kommersant were chosen because they are known in the U.S. and Russia as
leading elite publications providing readers with high-quality print publications and online
content. Both newspapers are well respected in their countries and reflect the liberal values of
their readership.
Founded in 1851, The New York Times is one of the oldest daily newspapers in the U.S.
with one of the highest print circulations in the country. It covers local, regional and national
issues and devotes considerable attention to the international news and events. The New York
Times is considered to be the most authoritative source of information and guidance on issues
of public policy (Friel & Falk, 2004) that sets the news agenda for citizens, politicians,
intellectuals and journalists of other media.
Kommersant is one of the most important dailies in Russia, which specializes in
reporting national and international politics as well as information about financial markets
(Beumers, Hutchings, Rulyova, 2008). Kommersant provides in-depth and comprehensive
coverage and discusses controversial subjects from different angles. In 2015 Kommersant
newspaper was at the top of “The Most Cited Russian Newspapers” rating, while
Kommersant online version was among the top 20 most cited web resources (“Ratings of
federal media,” 2015). Even though the Russian press is ranked as “Not Free”, this
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newspaper is considered to be one of the liberal and independent sources that “laid the
foundation for the development of intellectual influence of the press” (Vychuba and Frolov,
2007, p.51). According to Lipman (2010), Kommersant follows the principles of editorial
independence and is not controlled or driven by loyalty to the state (p. 157).
The choice of the newspapers is justified by the fact that both newspapers provide highquality content and project the principles of objectivity and neutrality, so their publications
are considered to be comparable. That provides the researcher with a perfect opportunity to
explore whether the coverage of the Crimean referendum was influenced by the differences
in the U.S. and Russian media systems, the differences in their perspectives, political,
historical, and other implications uncovered by the literature review. The paper seeks to
examine whether there is a difference in their online coverage and aims to explore which
news sources the two online newspapers relied on.
Based on the previous theoretical discussion about framing and media systems of the
United States and Russia, the following research questions are proposed:
RQ1 What sources did Kommersant and The New York Times use in their online
coverage of the Crimean referendum?
RQ2 On what themes did Kommersant and The New York Times focus in online articles
on the Crimean referendum? Is there any significant difference in themes between online
coverage from Russia and the United States?
RQ3 What is the difference in themes of Kommersant and The New York Times
publications about the Crimean referendum before it took place and afterwards?
RQ4 What are the most presented frames in Kommersant’s and The New York Times’
online coverage of the Crimean referendum?
RQ5 Is there any significant difference in utilization of frames in online coverage of
Kommersant and The New York Times
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Chapter Four
Method
In order to examine what news sources, themes, and frames were used in the online
coverage of The New York Times and Kommersant, the study utilizes content analysis - a
research method widely used in the field of media and mass communication (Neuendorf,
2002). According to Berelson (1952), content analysis is a research method used "for the
objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication"
(p. 18). “Content analysis can be used to show how sources of messages construct messages
and have motivations underlying the messages sent and how a source’s message is intended
to influence a specific receiver” (Wrench et al., 2008, p. 276). Thus, it is considered to be an
appropriate method for this study.
According to de Vreese (2004), there are two approaches for frame identification:
inductive and deductive. As the Crimean referendum is a unique issue, the inductive
approach allows the detection of issue-specific frames through a qualitative content analysis
of related news by identifying “the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases,
stereotyped images, sources of information and sentences that provide thematically
reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments” (Entman 1993, p. 52). These issue-specific frames
then are coded as holistic variables in a manual content analysis (Matthes & Kohring, 2008).
During the preliminary analysis the researcher had in mind generic frames outlined in
previous framing studies of news about conflicts and war. Thus, final framing content
analytical variables were identified inductively and deductively.
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Data Collection
All online publications covering the Crimean referendum in the online coverage of The
New York Times and Kommersant were selected for further analysis, excluding articles with a
different focus, letters to editors, transcribed live-broadcasts, and editorials. The search of
publications was performed by using “Crimean referendum” and “referendum in Crimea” key
phrases in the online databases of The New York Times, and “Крымский референдум”,
“референдум в Крыму” key phrases in the online database of Kommersant. The decision to
conduct the referendum was sudden and articles about the possibility of the referendum had
not occurred in media before the pro-Russian demonstrations took place in the Crimean city
of Sevastopol and Crimean local government buildings were seized by unidentified troops in
late February. For that reason this research is focused on a period of two months: one month
before the referendum and one month afterwards - from February 15, 2014 to April 16, 2014.
A total of 182 relevant articles were identified: 80 articles by The New York Times (37
articles before the referendum and 43 articles afterwards), and 102 articles by Kommersant
(55 articles before the referendum and 47 articles afterwards).

Table 2
Distribution of Publications

Valid Kommersant
The New York
Times
Total

Frequency Percent Valid Percent
102
56.0
56.0
80

44.0

44.0

182

100.0

100.0

Cumulative
Percent
56.0
100.0

The preliminary reading of the articles about the Crimean referendum identified five
themes that were used in the referendum online coverage 1) politics, 2) economy/finance,
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3) military activities/protests, 4) impact of the events on ordinary citizens, 5) other. Using
these themes, the coder determined the main theme of each news story: if more than half of
the story was devoted to one of the five themes identified, then the overall story theme was
identified as such.
Frames Definitions
The pre-test study identified a set of frames used in the online coverage of the
referendum.
1.

“Russia - invader” frame. This frame focuses on the illegitimate character of the

Crimean referendum and depicts Russia as a violator of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The
frame includes such English as well as Russian keywords and phrases as “occupation”,
“annexation”, “Russia’s invasion/aggression”, “Russia invaded Crimea”, “Kremlin’s
intervention”, “takeover”, “land grab”, “seizure of Crimea”, “incursion into Crimea”,
“absorption”, “Kremlin’s grasp”.
2.

“For referendum” set of frames. This set of frames emphasizes the legitimate

character of the Crimean referendum and focuses on the right of Crimea’s self-determination.
It portrays Ukraine’s government as radicals and nationalists, illegitimate and fascist. The
frame is divided into sub-frames which will be counted separately:
2.1

“Protection of the Russian population” frame includes such English as well

as Russian phrases as “the right to protect the Russian-speaking population”, “a threat to the
lives and health of Russian citizens”;
2.2

“Self-determination” frame includes such English as well as Russian phrases

as “the right of self-determination”, “consistent with international law”;
2.3

“Illegal Ukrainian government” frame includes such English as well as

Russian keywords and adjectives describing Ukrainian government as “illegal”, “fascist”,
“Bandera thugs”, “bandits”, “gangsters”, “an unconstitutional coup”.
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3.

“Against-referendum” set of frames. This set of frames emphasizes the

illegitimate character of the Crimean referendum and describes it as a farcical, hastily
arranged violation of international law. The frame is divided into sub frames which will be
counted separately:
3.1

“Breach of international law” frame includes such English as well as Russian

keywords and phrases as “a violation of Ukrainian constitution/ sovereignty/territorial
integrity”, “Russia’s unlawful actions”, “challenge to international agreements”, “breach of
international law”, “unconstitutional”, “illegal/illegitimate”, “vote is fiction”.
3.2

“False referendum” frame includes such English as well as Russian keywords

describing the Crimean referendum as “separatist”, “farcical”, “false”, “phony”, “rigged”,
“disputed”, “a farce”, “a fiction”, “a parody”, “a sham”.
4.

“Crimean ties” frame. This frame emphasizes historical and cultural ties of

Crimea and Russia. The frame includes such English as well as Russian keywords and
phrases as “predominantly ethnic Russian region”, “the largely pro-Russian region”,
“close/strong historic and/or linguistic and/or cultural ties to Russia”, “largely Russianspeaking Crimean peninsula”, “pro-Russian sentiment is widespread”, “home to a Russian
naval base/Black Sea fleet”, “a nostalgic place in the minds of many Russians”.
5.

“Russian military actions” frame. This frame focuses on Russian military

operation on the peninsula and assumes that unidentified troops that occupied Crimean
territory before and during the referendum were Russian special forces. The frame includes
such English as well as Russian keywords and phrases as “Russian military forces”, “Russian
troops stripped of identifying insignia”, “Russian military installations”, “deployment of
Russian special forces”, “military exercise / military maneuvers”, “military preparations”,
“Russia’s military moves”, “military buildup”, “escalation of Russian military actions”,
“militiamen, backed by Russian forces”.
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6.

“Threat to peace and security” frame. This frame outlines risks and fears

concerning the Crimean referendum and/or assumes which states may be occupied by Russia
in future. The frame includes the mention of the Cold War period and/or includes such
English as well as Russian keywords and phrases as “to pose a threat to peace and
security/sovereignty of Europe”, “the next Crimea”, “a threat of military confrontation/
response”, “fears of a new military incursion”, “threaten to split society”, “a chilling
prospect”, “a threat to the individual states of Europe”, “the Russian threat (expansionism),
“geopolitical risks”, “threats of violence/intimidation”.
7.

Economic consequences frame. This frame emphasizes the economic

consequences of the Crimean referendum. Neuman et al. (1992) identified it as a common
frame in the news. The frame includes such English as well as Russian keywords and phrases
as “sanctions”, “travel/visa bans and/or restrictions”, “asset freezes”, “economic blockade of
Russia”, “economic punishment”, “suspension of Gazprom exports”, “economic isolation”,
“damage to the economy”, “to punish/penalize Russia/ Putin”, “impact on the country’s
economy”, “the state of Russia’s currency/ruble”.
8.

Comparison frame. This frame compares the referendum in Crimea with previous,

future and hypothetical referendums on the status of other states and includes comparisons
with Kosovo (Yugoslavia), Catalonia region (Spain), Scotland (Great Britain), Quebec
(Canada), Dagestan (Russia), Chechnya (Russia), Tibet (China), Taiwan (China), Abkhazia
(Russia), South Ossetia (Russia), northern Cyprus (Turkey), Nagorno-Karabakh (Russia),
Transnistria (Moldova), South Sudan (Sudan), Palestine (Israel).
9.

Human interest frame. This frame focuses on the reaction and emotions of

Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar civilians of Crimea, Russia and Ukraine concerning the
referendum and possible annexation. According to Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), the
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Human interest frame refers to an effort to personalize the news in order to capture and retain
audience interest.
Coding Scheme
News articles were content analyzed in terms of the main theme, presence or absence of
sources and presence or absence of frames identified by the preliminary analysis of the
Crimean referendum online coverage. Each article was used as the primary unit of analysis.
The analysis is based on the percentage of stories that contains each individual frame. A
single story may contain multiple frames and sources of attribution. The articles were coded
according to the following criteria:
1. Name of newspaper. Kommersant and The New York Times.
2. Publication date of the article. In order to reveal changes in online coverage of the
stories, articles from each newspaper were divided into two periods: period 1- before
the referendum took place (February,15 – March,15), and period 2 – after the
referendum took place (March,16 – April, 16).
3. Sources of attribution. The articles were examined for presence or absence of
statements and quotations from the following sources: Western, Russian and
Ukrainian government officials (presidents, prime ministers and other local officials),
Western and Russian experts (political commentators, professors), representatives of
international organizations (representatives of the UN, the EU, and other
organizations), news media (other media outlets: newspapers or news agencies, for
example, The Washington Post, The Guardian, BBC, Associated Press, Izvestia),
ordinary people and civilians (Ukrainians, Crimean citizens, Russians).
4. Story frames. “Russia-invader”, “Protection of the Russian population”, “Selfdetermination”, “Illegal Ukrainian government”, “Breach of international law”,
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“False referendum”, “Crimean ties”, “Russian military actions”, “Threat to peace and
security”, Economic consequences, Comparison frame, and Human interest frame.
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Chapter Five
Results and Discussion
Intercoder Reliability
Intercoder reliability refers to the extent to which independent coders agree on the
coding of the content of interest with an application of the same coding scheme. In order to
assess intercoder reliability of the present study the following steps were taken. First, the
author (coder 1) coded the 182 news stories that appeared in the selected online
newspapers, according to the coding scheme. Using the same coding scheme, another
graduate student (coder 2) in Mass Communications at USF coded 20 % of articles
(36 stories) that were randomly selected from the pool of 182. Intercoder reliability was
assessed by two different measures: Percentages of coding agreement and Gwet’s (2014) AC1
coefficients. The results are presented in Table 3.
According to Neuendorf (2002, p. 145), percentage agreements “of .90 or greater are
nearly always acceptable, .80 or greater is acceptable in most situations, and .70 may be
appropriate in some exploratory studies for some indices.” In this study, seven of the 21
coding categories showed 80-90% agreement and fourteen reached greater than 90%
agreement between the two coders. According to Gwet (2014), an AC1 coefficient of .60-.80
indicates “good” strength of agreement, and an AC1 in the range of .80-1.0 is qualified as
“very good.” All AC1 coefficients obtained in this study are thus within the acceptable range
of agreement.
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Table 3
Intercoder Reliability
Coding Category

% Agreement

Gwet’s AC1

86.1

.8389

Human Interests

80.6

.6820

Comparison

86.1

.8027

Economic Consequences

91.7

.8526

Threat to Peace

86.1

.8069

Russian Military

94.4

.8902

Crimean Ties

86.1

.7459

False Referendum

88.9

.8688

Breach of Law

91.7

.8638

Illegal Government

91.7

.8580

Self Determination

80.6

.7511

Protection

91.7

.8876

Russia-Invader

91.7

.8476

Civilians

100

1.0000

Media

94.4

.9231

Representatives

94.4

.9301

Russian Experts

94.4

.8941

Western Experts

97.2

.9566

Ukrainian Officials

97.2

.9535

Russian Officials

97.2

.9448

Western Officials

100

1.0000

Theme
Frames

Sources

In this study, the Crimean referendum is used as a case study to analyze and compare
online media coverage in U.S. and Russian elite newspapers. The analysis of Kommersant
and The New York Times allows examination of differing perspectives and approaches to the
reporting of a controversial Crimean referendum in 2014. It provides more insight into how
national and foreign policy interests, different media systems, various historical and legal
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implications intersect with reporting practices.
The research explored what sources the two newspapers relied on, what themes were
discussed in the online articles about the referendum, and what frames were used in the
related articles in online coverage of the two countries. Five research questions guided the
data collection and analysis using SPSS.
RQ1 What sources did Kommersant and The New York Times use in their online
coverage of the Crimean referendum?
A series of pairwise z-tests of differences in proportions were performed in order to
determine what sources were used in the coverage of both newspapers and in order to
examine whether there is a significant difference in source attribution patterns between
Kommersant and The New York Times. The results are summarized in Table 4. The results
show that there is a significant difference in utilization of quotes and statements from
Western, Russian and Ukrainian government officials as well as in utilization of citations
from Western and Russian experts. The most quoted sources for Kommersant are the Russian
government officials (67.6%) and the Russian experts (56.9%), while the dominant sources
for The New York Times are the Western government officials (68.8%), followed by the
quotes from the Russian government officials and the Western experts that appear in the
coverage with the same frequency – in 37.5% of the stories. These results support the finding
of Blumler and Gurevitch (1981) that official sources are usually the dominant sources in
political news. It should be also noted that the statements from the Ukrainian officials are
found in the Russian newspaper in 12.7% of publications (it occurred to be almost the least
utilized source), while it is the third most quoted source for the U.S. newspaper (27.5%).
According to these results, we may assume that the American newspaper offered a greater
diversity of opinions providing more statements from the parties with differing perspectives
on the Crimean referendum. However, it should be noted that Kommersant did not only
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concentrate on the Russian perspective, but also provided statements from the Western
government officials in 21.6% of its coverage.
The fourth most utilized source for both newspapers is Crimean and Ukrainian
civilians: the citations of citizens appear in 17.6% of Kommersant news stories and in 22.5%
of The New York Times articles. Both newspapers used official sources more often than
individuals and civilians and this result is consistent with Sigal’s finding (1973). As shown in
Table 4, the next most used sources by Kommersant are the Western experts and
Representatives of international organizations that are present in 13.7% of the publications
followed by the Ukrainian government officials (12.7%), while for The New York Times the
sources of Crimean and Ukrainian civilians is followed by the Russian experts (17.5%) and
Representatives of international organizations (16.3%). The least utilized source for both
newspapers is other media outlets (news agencies, other newspapers, and online sources).
The quotes from other media outlets can be found in 9.8% of Russian publications and in
15% of the U.S. publications.
RQ2 On what themes did Kommersant and The New York Times focus in online
articles on the Crimean referendum? Is there any significant difference in themes between
online coverage from Russia and the United States?
In order to answer RQ2 the researcher followed a two-step procedure. First, Pearson’s
Chi-square test was used to test against the null hypothesis that the distribution of themes is
the same across both newspapers. The Chi-square test results (Table 5) in a p-value are
smaller than .05 (p=.001), it means that there is strong evidence to state that there is a
difference in themes distribution across the newspapers. Second, a set of pairwise z-tests of
differences in proportions were performed in order to determine which particular theme
significantly differed in online coverage of Kommersant and The New York Times. The
distribution of themes is shown in Table 6.
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Table 4
Crosstab: Sources of Attribution

Source
Western government Count
officials
% within Online newspaper

Newspaper
The New York
Kommersant
Times
22a
55b
21.6%

68.8%

Russian government
officials

Count

69a

30b

% within Online newspaper

67.6%

37.5%

Ukrainian
government officials

Count

13a

22b

% within Online newspaper

12.7%

27.5%

Count

14a

30b

% within Online newspaper

13.7%

37.5%

Count

58a

14b

% within Online newspaper

56.9%

17.5%

Count

14a

13a

% within Online newspaper

13.7%

16.3%

Count

10a

12a

% within Online newspaper

9.8%

15.0%

Western experts
Russian experts
Representatives of
international
organizations
Media outlets

Count
18a
18a
Crimean, Ukrainian
civilians
% within Online newspaper 17.6%
22.5%
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Newspaper categories whose column proportions do
not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level.
Table 5
Chi-Square Tests: Story Theme

Value

df

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)

Pearson Chi19.132a
4
.001
Square
Likelihood Ratio
19.646
4
.001
Linear-by-Linear
.022
1
.882
Association
N of Valid Cases
182
a. 1 cells (10.0%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 4.40.
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Table 6
Crosstab: Story Themes

Story theme politics

economy/finance

Online newspaper
The New
Kommersant York Times
43a
35a

Count
% within Online
newspaper
Count

% within Online
newspaper
military activities/ Count
protests
% within Online
newspaper
Count

impact of the
events on citizens % within Online
newspaper
other
Count

Total
78

42.2%

43.8%

42.9%

32a

12b

44

31.4%

15.0%

24.2%

8a

24b

32

7.8%

30.0%

17.6%

12a

6a

18

11.8%

7.5%

9.9%

7a

3a

10

% within Online
6.9%
3.8%
5.5%
newspaper
Total
Count
102
80
182
% within Online
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
newspaper
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Online newspaper categories whose column proportions
do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level.
As results indicate, the dominant theme of both newspapers’ publications concerning
the Crimean referendum is politics, which is followed by economy and finance in
Kommersant coverage, and military activities and protests in The New York Times coverage.
A series of z-tests (Table 6) determined that there is a significant difference in distribution of
these two themes. Kommersant touched upon the economy and finance theme in the coverage
of the referendum in 31.4% of publications while The New York Times only in 15%. It might
have happened because the issues of a possible inclusion of Crimea into the Russian
Federation and the influence of the event on the Russian economy had more direct
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implications for the Russian audience, while for the American audience the issues of the state
of Russian and Ukrainian economies and currency were of less significance. The difference
in the distribution of the theme focused on military activities and protests (7.8% for
Kommersant and 30% for The New York Times) can be explained by the fact that illegal
moves of Russian troops on a foreign territory were a very sensitive topic for the Russian
media as the deployment of troops had not been acknowledged by the Russian
administration. That might have been the reason why the Russian newspaper did not address
the military theme in the coverage of the referendum as frequently as the U.S. newspaper.
The third most popular theme in Kommersant online coverage is the impact of the events on
citizens (11.8%). Kommersant publications focused on that theme describing the impact of
depreciation of the ruble and sanctions on ordinary Crimean and Russian citizens’ lives and
the influence of the crisis on people engaged in the Crimean tourism industry. The New York
Times concentrated on the impact of the events in 7.5% of the publications and, unlike
Kommersant, the news stories in The New York Times mentioned the emotions and fears of
Crimean Tatars. A good example is a story dated March 13, 2014 with a headline “Mindful
of Past Many Tatars Fear of Russian Future”:
As Crimea prepares to vote on Sunday on whether to secede from Ukraine and join
Russia, the prospect of a renewed Russian presence in Crimea evokes for Tatars raw
memories of Communist-era depredations…Citing examples like Abkhazia and
Chechnya, many Tatars fear a war that would leave their relatively small population —
roughly 12 percent of Crimea — subject to ethnic backlash and the sort of repression
they only recently left behind. (Sneider, 2014)
The stories under the category of “other” theme appeared in both newspapers with the least
frequency: 6.9% for Kommersant publications and 3.8% for The New York Times articles.
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This category included news stories that could not be attributed to any other major theme and
that could not be grouped in a separate category because of their relatively small number.
RQ3 What is the difference in themes of Kommersant and The New York Times
publications about the Crimean referendum before it took place and afterwards?
The research is also focused on examining a possible difference in themes in
Kommersant and The New York Times online publications on the Crimean referendum during
the two time periods: before the referendum was conducted (February 15, 2014 – March 15,
2014) and afterwards (March 16, 2014 – April 16, 2014). A set of pairwise z-tests (Table 7)
revealed that there is no significant difference in the distribution of most themes in both
newspapers. The only difference that is supported by the test is the difference in the
distribution of the “economy and finance” theme and “other” themes in the Russian online
coverage. In the second period Kommersant focused on the “economy and finance” theme
twice as often as in the first period: the theme of economy appeared in 40% of the news
stories after the referendum took place. This can be explained by the unexpected
development of the events: the decision to hold the Crimean referendum was very fast and
Kommersant reporters could not possibly predict annexation and further economic
consequences before the referendum was conducted. However, after the referendum took
place and after the Russian government decided to proceed with “reunification”, Kommersant
publications started focusing more on economic measures against the Russian Federation and
on the integration of Crimea into Russia’s economy. The second theme showing the
difference in the distribution across the two periods is the theme under “other” category. The
results reveal that the first period includes all the articles coded under the theme “other”,
which illustrates that during the second period all the examined publications were assigned to
a certain major theme. According to this finding, we may assume that Kommersant online
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coverage became a little less diverse and more focused on major topics after the referendum
took place.
Table 7
Crosstab: Story Themes in Period 1 and Period 2
Publication date
February 15, 2014 - March 16, 2014 March 15, 2014
April 16, 2014

Online newspaper
Kommersant politics

Count

25a

18a

43

%
economy/ Count
finance
%

45.5%

38.3%

42.2%

11a

21b

32

20.0%

44.7%

31.4%

military Count
activities/
protests
%
the impact Count
of the
events
%

6a

2a

8

10.9%

4.3%

7.8%

6a

6a

12

10.9%

12.8%

11.8%

Count

7a

0b

7

%
Count
%
Count

12.7%
55
100.0%

0.0%
47
100.0%

6.9%
102
100.0%

17a
45.9%

18a
41.9%

35

3a
8.1%

9a
20.9%

15.0%

12a

12a

24

32.4%

27.9%

30.0%

3a

3a

6

8.1%

7.0%

7.5%

2a
5.4%
37
100.0%

1a
2.3%
43
100.0%

3

other
Total
The New
York
Times

Total

politics

%
economy/ Count
finance
%
military
Count
activities/
protests %
the impact Count
of the
events
%
other

Count

Total

%
Count
%

44

43.8%
12

3.8%
80
100.0%

Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Publication date categories whose column proportions
do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level.
RQ4 What are the most presented frames in Kommersant’s and The New York Times’
online coverage of the Crimean referendum?
Kommersant Framing
As Table 8 shows the most used frame in the Russian newspaper is the Economic
consequence (n=53, 52%). The prevalence of the Economic consequence frame in the
Russian newspaper can be attributed to the perceived high level of importance of the
referendum and its further influence on the state of Russia’s economy. At the beginning of the
first period Kommersant publications on the Crimean referendum view the event as an
occasion of Russia’s foreign policy, therefore direct consequences for the Russian economy
are rarely mentioned. However, after March 7 when the Supreme Council of Crimea voted to
join Russia, the Economic consequence frame appears almost in half of the sample materials,
as then the event gradually became an inevitable part of Russia’s domestic policy. The main
concerns connected with the economy include decline in the value of the ruble and foreign
investments, the transfer of the Crimea region to ruble transactions, sanctions against senior
Russian and Crimean officials, asset freezes, visa bans, suspension of Russia from the G8
group, suspension of Gazprom exports, and Russia’s economic isolation. For example, a news
story published on March 17, 2014 in Kommersant noted:
There is some evidence that The European Union has drawn up a list of 130 Russian
officials responsible for Russia’s actions in Ukraine. They could be subjected to travel
bans and asset freezes. Also, Russia might be stripped of G8 membership and there is
possibility of the G7 meeting in London instead of a planned G8 Sochi Summit in
Russia. (Strokan, 2014)
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Table 8
Crosstab: Frames of the Crimean Referendum
Frame
Kommersant

Newspaper
The New York
Times
56b
70.0%

Total

Russia-invader

Count
%

14a
13.7%

70
38.5%

Protection of the
Russian
population
Selfdetermination

Count
%

29a
28.4%

5b
6.3%

34
18.7%

Count
%

25a
24.5%

6b
7.5%

31
17.0%

Illegal Ukrainian
government

Count
%

28a
27.5%

16a
20.0%

44
24.2%

Breach of
International law

Count
%

27a
26.5%

35b
43.8%

62
34.1%

False referendum

Count
%

3a
2.9%

9b
11.3%

12
6.6%

Crimean ties

Count
%

33a
32.4%

25a
31.3%

58
31.9%

Russian military
actions

Count
%

9a
8.8%

40b
50.0%

49
26.9%

Threat to peace
and security

Count
%

16a
15.7%

23b
28.7%

39
21.4%

Economic
consequences

Count
%

53a
52.0%

35a
43.8%

88
48.4%

Comparison
frame

Count
%

13a
12.7%

23b
28.7%

36
19.8%

Human interest

Count
%

29a
28.4%

11b
13.9%

40
22.1%

Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Publication date categories whose column
proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level.
The Crimean ties frame is the second most presented frame in Russian online coverage
(n=33, 32.4%). Before the referendum, Kommersant articles often mention strong historic,
linguistic, cultural, and spiritual ties of Crimea to Russia. Utilization of this frame provides a
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certain justification to Russia’s policy toward Ukraine and makes further Russian moves more
acceptable for the Russian audience. After the referendum, this frame often appears in
Kommersant publications in quotes and statements of high-level Russian officials. For
example, a March 19 news report in Kommersant includes the following quote from President
Vladimir Putin’s address to State Duma deputies:
Millions of people went to bed in one country and awoke in different ones, overnight
becoming ethnic minorities in former Union republics, while the Russian nation
became one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided
by borders (Kolesnikov, 2014).
The Crimean ties frame is followed by the Human interest frame: 28.4% of Kommersant
online articles focus on reactions and emotions of Russian citizens, Crimeans, and Tatar
civilians. Most of the articles are dominated by quotes of civilians with pro-Russian
sentiment who express enthusiasm concerning “reunification with Russia”. Even though it is
more of an exception, a contrary point of view can also be found in Kommersant online
coverage:
However, for many Crimean citizens the secession from Ukraine is a personal drama.
Father serves in a brigade of the Russian Black Sea fleet while his son is a Ukrainian
soldier; mother of a Crimean fiancé is Chairman of the Party of Regions local
department while mother of a bride is a member of the Batkivschyna party from Lviv…
(Galustyan, 2014)
The results also show that more than one-fourth of Kommersant news articles utilized at
least one of the For-referendum frames: the Protection of the Russian population (n=29,
28.4%), the Illegal Ukrainian government (n=28, 27.5%), and the Self-determination (n=25,
24.5%). It can be assumed that Kommersant publications stress the national interest and
depend on Russian government policy: this finding supports Entman’s (1991) theory that
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states that socio-political reality influences media framing. An unexpected and interesting
finding, though, is that the frame focused on violation of international law – the Breach of
international law – also frequently appears in Russian online articles (n=27, 26.5%).
Kommersant journalists quote other foreign media (The Wall Street Journal, Le Monde, Le
Figaro) that report on Russia’s unlawful actions. Kommersant articles also mention various
foreign leaders who condemned Russia for violation of the Ukrainian constitution and
territorial integrity. For example, a Kommersant news story of March 17 suggested:
The referendum is regarded illegitimate by French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius,
UK Prime Minister David Cameron, US President Barack Obama, President of the
European Commission José Manuel Barroso and President of the European Council
Herman Van Rompuy, Canada's Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Japanese Cabinet
Secretary Yoshihide Suga. (Dudina, 2014)
The most likely explanation of the relatively high percentage of the Breach of international
law frame in Kommersant online coverage is that the newspaper known as “one of the last
strongholds of independent media in Russia” (Henry, Mauldin, & Humber, 2006) tries to
stand up to high journalistic values.
Frames that have the lowest frequency in Russian coverage include the Threat to peace
and security (n=16, 15.7%), the Russia-invader (n=14, 13.7%), the Comparison frame (n=13,
12.7%), the Russian military actions (n=9, 8.8%) and the False referendum frame (n=3,
2.9%). All of them, except for a neutral Comparison frame which compares the Crimean
referendum to other referendums on status, attribute to a controversial character of the
referendum and characterize Russia as an aggressor. The low percentage of these frames in
Kommersant can be explained by the influence of Russian national interests, political
implications and the neo-authoritarian media system. These frames are mostly mentioned in
the direct quotes of foreign politicians and experts. However, the mere presence of such
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frames in a number of Kommersant news stories shows that the newspaper tries to cover the
subject from different perspectives and conform to high standards of journalism, even in the
media system ranked as “Not Free” by Freedom House.
The New York Times Framing
The most utilized frame in the online coverage of The New York Times is the Russiainvader frame, which appears in 70% of publications. This frame implies Russian aggressive
actions toward Ukraine and includes such words as “annexation”, “land grab”, “occupation”,
“seizure” and “take over”. The frame also appears in connection with the second most
presented frame in The New York Times online coverage which focuses on Russian military
operations on the peninsula – the Russian military actions frame (n=40, 50%). An example of
both frames is the following paragraph in the March 3, 2014 article of The New York Times:
But the events unfolding in major Ukrainian cities in recent days appear to match a
pattern played by the Kremlin in Crimea, where pro-Moscow forces paving the way for
Russia to seize control were neither altogether spontaneous, nor entirely local (Roth,
2014).
As shown in Table 8, the Economic consequence frame is the third most presented frame in
The New York Times publications (43.8%). In comparison to Kommersant, the American
newspaper focused its coverage mostly on a possible economic blockade of Russia and such
economic measures as sanctions or asset freezes, paying less attention to the state of Russia’s
and Ukraine’s currency and the internal economic issues of Crimea. The Breach of
international law frame has the same frequency in The New York Times online coverage as
the Economic consequence (n=35, 43.8%). Unlike Kommersant articles, The New York Times
publications mention the illegitimate character of the referendum not only in quotes of
American and European leaders, but also in the reflections of The New York Times reporters.
The Crimean ties frame was also used in abundance (n=25, 31.3%), although, the interesting
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finding is that, despite noting pro-Russian sentiment and close ties to Russia, The New York
Times publications gave a broader perspective and often indicated that the region is also
populated by a large number of Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. Thus, the newspaper
provided more objective reports. For example, the story of March 1, 2014 stated:
The strategically important peninsula, which has been the subject of military disputes
for centuries, has strong historic, linguistic and cultural ties to Russia. The population
of roughly two million is predominantly Russian, followed by a large number of
Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, people of Turkic-Muslim origin. (Smale & Erlanger,
2014)
As the results indicate, Threat to peace and security frame emerges in 28.7% of The New York
Times news stories. This frame is mostly obvious in the coverage with frequently mentioned
implications and references to the Cold War period, suggesting possible geopolitical risks
triggered by “Russian expansionism”. A good example of this frame is found in the following
paragraph of the March 1 report of The New York Times:
What began three months ago as a protest against the Ukrainian government has now
turned into a big-power confrontation reminiscent of the Cold War and a significant
challenge to international agreements on the sanctity of the borders of the post-Soviet
nations. (Smal & Erlanger, 2014)
The Comparison frame also appears in 28.7% of The New York Times publications. A large
portion of the Comparison frame includes references to Kosovo’s secession from Serbia and
compares the Crimea region to other regions like Catalonia in Spain, South Ossetia in Russia,
or Scotland in Great Britain. This frame cannot be considered merely as pro or against
referendum as in various articles different comparisons made by The New York Times
reporters lead to opposite conclusions, thus The New York Times provided different
perspectives on the portrayal of this controversial event. The frame of Illegal government,
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utilized concerning the Ukrainian administration at the time of the conflict, describes
Ukrainian leaders as “bandits”, “fascists” and “gangsters”. It appears in 20% of The New York
Times news stories being dominated by the quotes of Russian officials and statements from
Ukraine’s former president Viktor Yanukovych.
The next emerging frame in The New York Times online coverage is the Human
interest (n=11, 13.9%). While Kommersant utilizes this frame speaking about the reactions of
Russians or Ukrainian citizens with a pro-Russian position, the same frame in The New York
Times is dominated by portrayals of Tatar civilians and Crimeans who expressed doubts
about the referendum. For example, it is hard to imagine that the following paragraph could
have appeared in Kommersant, however, it emerges in the March 8 news story of the
American newspaper:
In Bakhchysaray, the historical center of what was once the Crimean Tatars’ homeland,
several hundred protesters, mostly Tatar women and children, marched against
integration with Russia, waving Ukrainian and Tatar flags, and chanting “We’re for
peace,” “Ukraine is inseparable,” and “Russian soldiers, go home!” (Myers & Erlanger,
2014)
The frame False referendum dominated by adjectives “farcical”, “phony”, “disputed”,
“rigged” in description of the referendum shows up in 11.3% of The New York Times
publications. This frame, along with Breach of international law frame is included in the
Against-referendum set of frames. However, unlike the Breach of international law frame
(which is present in 43.8% of articles), it is one of the three least utilized frames. It can be
explained by the fact that there was often a fine line between the False referendum frame that
implies the false and controversial character of the referendum and the Breach of international
law frame that implies its illegitimate character. The meaning of both frames is very close,
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but the adjectives indicated in the codebook for the False referendum frame were not used as
often as it had been assumed before the coding was performed.
The percentage of the stories under For-referendum set of frames is small: 7.5% for the
Self-determination frame and 6.3% for the Protection of the Russian population frame. These
frames mostly appear in statements of Russian officials: often the context of a story implies
that such justifications of the referendum are groundless. For example, one of The New York
Times publications cited the Russian ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, who called the Crimean
referendum an exercise in “self-determination”, while the next paragraph includes the quote
from the American ambassador, Samantha Power: “I missed the day in law school where selfdetermination was defined as Russia-determination” (Sengupta, 2014). Overall, according to
the analysis of The New York Times online publications, it can be assumed that almost every
article contained a certain frame as well as some opposing reasoning: allowing the readers of
The New York Times to make their own decisions and decide “what to think about” the
Crimean referendum and the parties involved.
RQ5 Is there any significant difference in utilization of frames in online coverage of
Kommersant and The New York Times?
A performed set of pairwise z-tests of difference in proportions (Table 8) revealed that
only three frames out of twelve did not show a significant difference in utilization by
Kommersant and The New York Times. The publications of both newspapers did not differ
considerably in the frequency of the Illegal Ukrainian government frame (27.5% for
Kommersant versus 20% for The New York Times), the Crimean ties frame (32.4% for
Kommersant versus 31.3% for The New York Times), and the Economic consequences frame
(52% for Kommersant versus 43.8% for The New York Times). The most dramatic difference
is seen in the frame Russia – invader (13.7% for Kommersant versus 70% for The New York
Times), the Russian military actions (8.8% for Kommersant versus 50% for The New York
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Times), and both For-referendum frames: the Protection of the Russian population (28.4% for
Kommersant versus 6.3% for The New York Times) and the Self-determination (24.5% for
Kommersant versus 7.5% for The New York Times). The difference in percentages is
considerable, however, such distribution of frames was expected. It can be explained by a
theoretical section of the research that outlines governmental and political context influence
on editorial policy. Unsurprisingly, in order to justify the referendum and further Crimean
secession from Ukraine, the Russian newspaper utilized the For-referendum set of frames
more frequently and provided less evidence of the illegitimate character of Crimean
annexation and Russian unlawful military moves, while the U.S. newspaper utilized the Forreferendum frames mostly in the quotes of Russian political leaders and pro-Russian
population exposing more data about Russian military activities. It should be noted that the
Russian government had not acknowledged that the Russian military backed Crimean selfdefense forces until April 17 when Vladimir Putin admitted that Russian troops were
deployed to Crimea (Anischchuk, 2014). That might have been the reason why only 8.8% of
Kommersant stories contained subtle mentions of Russian military maneuvers.
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Chapter Six
Conclusion
The 2014 Crimean referendum was a controversial international event that received
considerable coverage in the mass media all over the world. This study is a comparative
framing analysis of online publications from the U.S. and Russia. The event has been of
political interest to both countries and provided an opportunity to examine themes, source
attribution patterns and frames in the coverage of liberal, well-respected media outlets in
Russia (Kommersant) and in the United States (The New York Times). According to
Watanabe (2014), the understanding of the events in Ukraine totally depended on news
media. This study has found these two newspapers differently described the same event. The
reported differences can be explained by variations in political interests, media systems,
journalistic standards, cultural and historical ties outlined by literature.
According to Shoemaker and Reese (1991), sources may significantly impact a news
story. The results of this research on source attribution patterns are consistent with previous
studies, which have shown that the most common sources in news stories are government
officials (Sigal, 1973; Zoch & Turk, 1998; Blumler & Gurevitch, 1981). Unsurprisingly,
Russia and the U.S. relied heavily on their respective officials and experts. An important
finding of the study is that the Ukrainian officials appeared more frequently in The New York
Times coverage than in Kommersant coverage (27.5% vs 12.7%). This result reflects the
different perspectives of both countries and shows how media outlets frame the publications
by utilizing statements of government officials with compatible views to their national
interests, rather than quotes with opposing views. Overall, The New York Times in
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comparison to Kommersant showed a greater diversity of news sources. This result can be
explained by the fact that the liberal media system of the U.S. welcomes diverse opinions
operating under the principle of freedom of speech (Merill & Lowenstein, 1979). At the same
time, even though Kommersant is considered one of the liberal and independent media outlets
in Russia, it still exists under unwritten rules of its neo-authoritarian model and depends on
the government’s tone and attitude.
The study’s results have shown the dominant theme of the referendum media coverage
for both newspapers is politics; however, there is a significant difference in other themes of
the coverage. The next most popular theme for Kommersant is economy and finance, while
The New York Times focused on military activities and protests. This finding can be
explained by the different national political interests that play a significant role in framing the
international news. The Russian government had not acknowledged the presence of the
Russian troops on the Crimean peninsula at the time period on which the research focused, so
Kommersant strayed from revealing the details about Russian military operations. The New
York Times, following the interests of U.S. foreign policy, exposed facts about aggressive
Russian conduct. Nonetheless, it should be noted that a comparison between themes in time
periods before and after the referendum has not revealed a major difference between the
newspapers.
The results obtained indicate a meaningful difference in frames used by the two
newspapers. It has been demonstrated that Russia tended to portray the Crimean referendum
in a more favorable light, utilizing a set of the For-referendum frames more often than the
U.S. However, the unexpected finding is that Kommersant often used one of the Againstreferendum frames - Breach of international law. One of the most noteworthy issues to
consider is that while both newspapers utilized similar frames, they emphasized different
aspects. For example, the majority of the Human interest frame in Kommersant focused on
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emotions and reactions of Crimeans and Russians favorable to the referendum, while The
New York Times concentrated on the event’s impacts on Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars and
their doubts about the consequences of annexation.
Summing up the results, one can conclude the media coverage differences arise not
only from a simplistic contrast between libertarian and neo-authoritarian models of the media
system, but also come from political and national interests, and the cultural and historical ties
between involved parties. Consistent with the findings by Reese (2003) and Scheufele
(2000), the study’s result showed that journalistic norms and routines of the particular media
outlets also played an important role in the media coverage of the Crimean referendum. The
results have indicated that Kommersant with a reputation of a liberal newspaper has been
trying to perform independent reporting in Russia, a country identified by Freedom House as
“Not Free”, frequently utilizing quotes from Western officials (21.6%) and mentioning
arguments against the 2014 Crimean referendum. Only a few studies compare coverage of
media outlets that perform high journalistic standards in countries with different political and
media systems. This thesis provided evidence that the U.S and the Russian newspapers had a
different pattern of news coverage. The findings of this research add to the body of literature
on framing presenting such cross-country comparisons.
By comparing the online coverage of two newspapers from different nations, the study
also has implications for international communication research, as it examines numerous
variables that influence international news coverage. This paper has shown that even though
both newspapers are considered independent in their respective countries, their foreign
coverage still relies on governmental sources and reflects their political ideologies. The
study’s results are also consistent with findings of Bazaa and Hsiao (2010) that indicate the
international coverage is largely influenced by the states of diplomatic relationships between
countries. The existence of this tendency as well as the dependence of the audience
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perception on foreign news coverage by their home media (Flournoy & Stewart, 1997)
implies readers should rely on a variety of news media in order to get a more complete
picture of foreign events.
Limitations and Future Research
The Crimean referendum attracted a lot of attention around the world. This content
analysis included only two months of news coverage from two newspapers in two countries.
A longer-term observation and data collection from various outlets can provide a more
accurate picture on how media systems and news sources affect the controversial referendum
framing. Another limitation lies in the chosen methodology as the researcher decided to
utilize issue-specific frames which, on the one hand, “allow for a profound level of
specificity and details relevant to the event” (Semetko & de Vreese, 2004, p. 93) but, on the
other hand, such an issue-specific approach is considered to be rather subjective. Oftentimes,
the issue-specific approach makes it difficult to generalize and compare the analysis. In order
to get a better understanding of how various media systems, political interests, cultural and
historical ties influence media framing, further studies of the topic need to address more
generic and new issue-specific frames.
The present study did not code for headlines and did not examine editorial materials,
but only focused on news reports. Future framing studies on the referendum can pay
particular attention to news stories’ headlines, subheads and leads as these elements are also
known as powerful framing devices (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Future framing research can
analyze editorial and opinion columns, as these materials are more likely to express the
subjective view of the newspaper which strays from the objectivity norm. Besides text,
further research can explore visual framing in the news coverage between two countries.
During the analysis, the researcher noticed a photo or a short video report accompanies
almost every online publication. Visuals can operate as framing devices which offer “a
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number of different condensing symbols that suggest the core frame” (Gamson & Stuart,
1992) and can also influence the evaluation of journalistic stories.
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Appendix
Codebook
Coded By______________________
Story Number__________________
1. Online newspapers
(1) The New York Times

(2) Kommersant

2. Publication date of the article
(1)February 15, 2014 – March 15, 2014

(2) March 16, 2014 – April 16, 2014

3. Story themes
Please, code each publication into one of the five theme categories. Take into account only
the dominant theme, other themes that may appear in the article should be neglected.
(1) politics;
(2) economy/finance;
(3) military activities/ protests;
(4) impact of the events on ordinary citizens;
(5) other.

4. Sources of attribution
Source

Yes/Present

Western government officials (including presidents, prime
ministers and other politicians)
Russian and Crimean government officials (including
president, prime minister and other politicians)
Ukrainian government officials (newly appointed prime
minister and members of his government)
Western experts (such as political commentators, professors)
Russian experts (such as political commentators, professors)
Representatives of international organizations (representatives of
the UN, EU, etc.)
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No/Absent

Other media outlets (newspapers or news agencies such as BBC,
Associated Press, The Washington Post, The Guardian, Izvestia)
Crimeans, Ukrainian civilians

5. Story frames
Please, code each article according to presence or absence of the frames identified below. Pay
attention to certain phrases and keywords. A single story may contain multiple frames.

Frame
1) Russia

Yes/Present

- invader. This frame focuses on illegitimate character of the

Crimean referendum and depicts Russia as a violator of Ukraine’s territorial
integrity. The frame includes such keywords and phrases as “occupation”,
“annexation”, “Russia’s invasion/aggression”, “Russia invaded
Crimea”, “Kremlin’s intervention”, “takeover”, “land grab”, “seizure
of Crimea”, “incursion into Crimea”, “absorption”, “Kremlin’s grasp”.

2.1) Protection

of the Russian population. This frame includes

such phrases as “the right to protect the Russian-speaking population”,
“a threat to the lives and health of Russian citizens”.
2.2 ) Self-determination. This frame includes such phrases as “the
right of self-determination”, “consistent with international law”
2.3 ) Illegal

Ukrainian government. This frame includes such

keywords and adjectives describing Ukrainian government as “illegal”,
“fascist”, “Bandera thugs”, “bandits”, “gangsters”, “an
unconstitutional coup”.
3.1) Breach

of international law. This frame includes such

keywords and phrases as “a violation of Ukrainian constitution/
sovereignty/territorial integrity”, “Russia’s unlawful actions”,
“challenge to international agreements”, “breach of international law”,
“unconstitutional”, “illegal/illegitimate”, “vote is fiction”.
3.2) False

referendum. This frame includes such keywords and

adjectives describing the Crimean referendum as “separatist”, “farcical”,
“false”, “phony”, “rigged”, “disputed”, “a farce”, “a fiction”, “a
parody”, “a sham”.
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No/Absent

4) Crimean

ties. This frame emphasizes historical and cultural ties of

Crimea and Russia. The frame includes such English as well as Russian
keywords and phrases as “predominantly ethnic Russian region”, “the
largely pro-Russian region”, “close/strong historical and/or linguistic
and/or cultural ties to Russia”, “largely Russian-speaking Crimean
peninsula”, “pro-Russian sentiment is widespread”, “home to a
Russian naval base/Black Sea fleet”, “a nostalgic place in the minds of
many Russians”.

5)

Russian military actions. This frame focuses on Russian

military operation on the peninsula and assumes that unidentified troops
that occupied Crimean territory before and during the referendum were
Russian special forces. The frame includes such keywords and phrases as
“Russian military forces”, “Russian troops stripped of identifying
insignia”, “military installations”, “deployment of Russian special
forces”, “military exercise / military maneuvers”, “military
preparations”, “Russia’s military moves”, “military buildup”,
“escalation of Russian military actions”, “militiamen, backed by
Russian forces”.
6) Threat to piece and security. This frame outlines risks and fears
concerning the Crimean referendum and/or assumes which states may be
occupied by Russia in future. The frame includes such keywords and
phrases as “Cold War”, “pose a threat to peace and
security/sovereignty of Europe”, “the next Crimea”, “a threat of
military confrontation/ response”, “fears of a new military incursion”,
“threaten to split society”, “a chilling prospect”, “a threat to the
individual states of Europe”, “the Russian threat (expansionism),
“geopolitical risks”, “threats of violence/intimidation”.
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7)

Economic consequences. This frame emphasizes the

economic consequences of the Crimean referendum. The frame includes
such keywords and phrases as “sanctions”, “travel/visa bans and/or
restrictions”, “asset freezes”, “economic blockade of Russia”,
“economic punishment”, “suspension of Gazprom exports”,
“economic isolation”, “damage to the economy”, “to punish/penalize
Russia/ Putin”, “impact on the country’s economy”, “the state of
Russia’s currency/ruble.

8)

Comparison frame. This frame compares the referendum in

Crimea with previous, future and hypothetical referendums on status of
other states and includes comparisons with Kosovo (Yugoslavia),
Catalonia region (Spain), Scotland (Great Britain), Quebec (Canada),
Dagestan (Russia), Chechnya (Russia), Tibet (China), Taiwan
(China), Abkhazia (Russia), South Ossetia (Russia), northern Cyprus
(Turkey), Nagorno-Karabakh (Russia), Transnistria (Moldova),
South Sudan (Sudan), Palestine (Israel).

9)

Human interest. This frame focuses on the reaction and

emotions of Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar civilians. Human interest frame
refers to an effort to personalize the news in order to capture and retain
audience interest.
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